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From war to Dayton
- the new order in the Balkans
Hido Biscevic
Trying to assess the outcome of 2 I days of hard
negotiations in Dayton - the peace accord on Bosnia-
Herzegovina and a number of agreements aimed at re-
establishing peace, stability and normality in the region
with the idea that the implementation instruments will be
developed at several international conferences planned
to take place in the near future - is an exercise marked by
mixed feelings.
The prospect of peace after years of total mistrust
gives rise to disbelief and caution - behind us are too many
agreements which served as an alibi for continued
aggression, a cover for ethnic and geopolitical
"reprogramming of the region". It will take time for hope
to turn into confidence. On the thin line between justice
and realpolitik, where moral principles and lofty values
clash with the international balance of power and
contlicting interests, it is difficult to have a clear vision
of the long-term effects of the agreements.
Nevertheless, I am deeply convinced that the
Dayton accords mark the turning point in the political
resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
milestone on the road of defining the regional and
European security architecture on the eve of the 21 st
century. I therefore propose to look beyond the doubts,
dilemmas and necessary caution ofthe moment and outline
some of the basic elements of the "Dayton logic" and its
long-term effects. In order to do this, it is important to
focus on the time the United States chose to become
directly involved in the resolution ofthe conflict - although
formally acting within the Contact Group. I believe that
this timing was not merely in the service of American
electoral pragmatism: although it may have triggered it,
it was part of a wider realization of the real dangers
inherent in the prolongation of the crisis caused by
ineffective political action.
In retrospect, it is already clear that the
international community - leaving aside its self-justifying
moralizing - finally recognized and accepted the historical
inevitability ofa redefinition of the overall regional ethnic,
political and international-legal outlook; it had accepted
or was beginning to adapt to the foreseeable final results
of that process, but chose to leave it to the logic of war to
be the instrument of the transformation.
This applies in particular to the situation of a year
ago, when the international community realized that a
lasting resolution was possible only if conditions were
created for a new regional order based on balanced
relations between the Croat-Bosnian and Serbian entities
in territorial, political, military, economic and
demographic terms - by satisfying the realistically
assessed interests of the Croats, Bosnians and Serbs
against the background of the desirable geopolitical and
geostrategic outlook of the region and at the same time
"separating the overheated ethnic groups". It was only on
this basis that the necessary commonality of interests of
the European powers could be expected.
To that extent the "logic of Dayton" results from
the "logic of the Contact Group", which was just another
name for the internal separation of the Croats and
Bosnians from the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with
clear indications ofa constitutional solution which would
leave open the possibility for a number of future options
(the two extremes: complete separation or coexistence).
It is important to note that this process in Bosnia-
Herzegovina will depend on the overall development of
European processes, that is, on whether Europe will allow
the logic of polarization and confrontation to prevail or
whether it will try to create a global transparent and
cooperative system reaching "from the Atlantic to
Vladivostok". If they are implemented, the Dayton accords
will preserve the status quo in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in
the forthcoming period, the processes in Europe and in
Bosnia-Herzegovina will be mutually complementary and
will determine the nature of future relations .on the
continent.
In this situation, the Dayton accords and the
ensuing implementation instruments will put an end to
the war but will not freeze the actual historical, political,
ethnic and social processes in the region. To put it crudely,
we are entering a period in which "peace will be the
continuation of war with different means". Therefore, in
order to evaluate the results of the Dayton accords for
each party to the contlict it is necessary to assess from
what positions and with what cards they are entering the
coming period and the inevitable process of the final
shaping of the region, including its ethnic and geopolitical
outlook.
The international community, then, recognized and
tacitly accepted the concept of the internal separation in
Bosnia - Herzegovina ("The Federation of Independent
States of Bosnia and Herzegovina") as the starting point
for the creation of a new and balanced regional order; for
the past six months it has left it to the 'parties in the
conflict' to use a combination of military and political
means to shape their new geopolitical, military and
territorial relations.
Under these circumstances it was essential for
Croatia to realistically assess the military situation in the
early summer of 1995.
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It may be useful to remember at this point that the
Western indulgence towards Belgrade had led to a
geostrategic situation which was highly unfavourable for
the Croats and Bosnians. Belgrade was aware of the fact
that a state of neither war nor peace would weaken its
position (impaired by sanctions and the military position
of the Bosnian Serbs) and was trying to revert the war
dynamics and prepare the ground for the final delimitation
of Serbian territories in ex-Yugoslavia. With the then still
existing Krajina, which it kept alive as the final
negotiating stake through manipulation (change of
leadership), the international community (negotiations on
ways of "integration": autonomy of districts, Z-4, etc.)
and direct logistical support (weapons, food), the Serbian
side launched military operations aimed at the definitive
ethnic cleansing of eastern Bosnia. Their strategy of
maximum gains was obvious; their tactic of "intimidating"
the international community (kidnapping UN soldiers,
blocking humanitarian convoys, continuing the total
blockade of Sarajevo, targeting NA TO aircraft) was aimed
at strengthening the position of those international forces
(capitals) that were against direct military intervention
because of their own interests:
In retrospect, the achievements of Dayton can
probably best be measured against the background of a
possible development in which Belgrade would have
succeeded in holding on to the Krajinas in Croatia and in
tailoring the map in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on which at
least half the territory of Bosnia including the Bihac area
and eastern Bosnia would be Serbian, without any
intervention by the international community. Had this
happened, negotiations would hardly have been necessary.
This very real possibility shows the vital
importance of Operation Storm. It not only reversed the
course of the war and thwarted the Serbian global strategic
goals (the Krajinas plus at least half of Bosnia-
Herzegovina) but it opened the way for new strategic
relations and, through the national and strategic alliance
with the Bosnians, created the preconditions for a balance
of power in the region that was on the line of interests of
the international community.
The strong American involvement in the Contact
Group - which emphasized the fact that the big powers
were acting in unison while adhering to the logic of
internal separation - occurred at the moment when military
operations had created a balance of power between the
Croat-Bosnian and the Serbian sides. An additional motive
for this timing - when the processes of separation had
not yet been completed and the geopolitical landscape was
not yet quite stable and logical neither from the standpoint
of the three peoples nor in terms of European relations as
a whole - was the realization that a continuation of the
process through military means would lead to
unforeseeable consequences for the relations in the region
and Europe and, possibly, to a scenario of catastrophe
and anarchy.
The moment chosen for action and the assessment
that the crisis was "ripe" for resolution pointed to the
principles on which solution would be based.
The starting concept, according to which the only
lasting solution was possible by redressing the balance
and thus creating a framework for the future stable
regional order - indicated that the logic of realistic
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compromise would be the key to the negotiations, applying
both to territorial and constitutional-political dimensions
of the accords.
The second starting point was only indirectly
present in Dayton, but it is crucial for future developments:
the nature of the proposed and adopted solutions for
Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly displays that the processes of
the final territorial and political shape of the region have
not been completed with the initialling in Dayton nor will
they be halted by later developments. This does not apply
only to the controversial and open questions which are to
be solved through international arbitration - although it
is significant they include the area around Brcko and the
so-called corridors, undoubtedly the most important points
for a final settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
region.
In a nutshell, the process envisaged by the Dayton
accords stops the war as a means for ordering relations
in the region and introduces elements of normalization -
ranging from mutual recognition by the states involved
to reconstruction - while leaving room for the next stage,
in which military confrontation will be replaced by "soft",
gradual solutions.
In these circumstances, an objective assessment of
the achievements and effects of Dayton for the future
position of Croatia must start from a number of
indisputable facts.
Firstly, that six months ago Croatia's military and
political position was far more unfavourable in terms of
the final territorial and political solutions for the new
regional configuration outlined in Dayton.
Secondly, that Croatia succeeded in recognizing
the fundamental principle in the approach of the
international community - political compromise as an
instrument for achieving balanced relations in the region
- and in using it to the best effect to protect its national
and state interests in the present phase of the crisis. In
this, four elements stand out: the agreement on Eastern
Siavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium with firm
guarantees (the USA; recognition; and Croatia's strength
today); the agreement on the strengthening of the
Federation as the basic framework for Croatian national
and state interests, with indisputable geostrategic,
economic and other advantages in the context of the
expected balanced outlook of the region; normalization
of relations in the region (recognition, economic
development, communications, etc.) and prospects for
stability and development in the entire region.
The processes that will follow after the peace
agreement will be marked by attempts of the three parties
in the crisis to use political, economic, social and other
means to strengthen their position and achieve maximum
gains wherever possible. As the implementation of the
agreement will depend on its interpretation and on the
power of Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo, it is reasonable
to say that Croatia is entering the forthcoming period with
the strongest strategic position and that the consistent
implementation of all the Dayton agreements will secure
its fundamental strategic interests and make it the key to
the creation of a new, balanced regional order in this part
of Europe. •
